Torts by Probert, Walter
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 3
1958
Torts
Walter Probert
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Walter Probert, Torts, 9 W. Res. L. Rev. 372 (1958)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol9/iss3/29
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The Board of Tax Appeals in reviewing an assessment by the Tax
Commissioner must base its decision on the evidence, and when the rec-
ord before the Board contains merely the order of the commissioner on
one side and substantial evidence supporting the taxpayer's claim on the
other, the Board may not reasonably affirm the order of the commis-
sioner 7
Injunction Against Tax Collection
Section 2723.01, Ohio Revised Code, confers jurisdiction upon the
courts of common pleas to enjoin the illegal levy or collection of taxes
and assessments and to entertain actions to recover them when collected.
In Charles V. Birdsong, Inc. v. Taylor,28 the taxpayer filed a suit pursu-
ant to this statute to enjoin the collection of a personal property tax by
the Ohio Tax Commissioner because of alleged illegality and invalidity.
There was no appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals. The court of appeals
held that the action could not be maintained because the taxpayer had
failed to pursue his administrative remedies and affirmed a judgment on
the pleadings in favor of the defendants.
MAURICE S. CULP
TORTS
There were few torts in the Ohio courts last year, at least few that
would leave any lasting impression or be classified otherwise than mis-
cellaneous. In the foothills of future peak decisions was the ruling by a
c9mmon pleas court which distinguished so-called charitable hospitals
from a Roman Catholic church and refused to impose liability upon the
church for the possible negligence of its officers.1 Two courts of appeals
dealt with the problems of minors. First, parents or other persons who
sponsor the driving of minors under eighteen by signing their applica-
tions for drivers' licenses appear to be completely responsible for the
driving habits of those minors. At least that is the result of the latest
decision on the matter barring a father from recovering for damage to
his car caused by the combined negligence of his son and another driver.2
The other decision denied a cause of action to a minor daughter against
persons who were allegedly negligent in causing physical damage to her
'Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Bowers, 166 Ohio St. 122, 140 N.E.2d 313
(1957). The decision on this issue is an express approval and affirmance of the
position previously taken in Bloch v. Glander, 151 Ohio St. 381, 86 N.E.2d 318
(1949).
'103 Ohio App. 123, 144 N.E.2d 689 (1956).
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father resulting in loss to the daughter of love, affection, companionship,
and so on.3
Two decisions in related areas deserve mention. A court of appeals
would impose a warranty liability upon a manufacturer regardless of lack
of privity with the claiman 4  In an equally progressive decision, the
Supreme Court approved the joinder as defendants of contributors to. a
nuisance, basing the decision on their allegedly "joint" adventure, but
suggesting that joinder might be based on the indivisibility of the
damage.5
Outside the "miscellaneous" category were a few cases of more direct
or more permanent interest. Thus, for better or for worse, we now know
that the Supreme Court stands among the extremists in its definition of
libel .per se. In Becker v. Todmit 6 the court has indicated that allegedly
libelous statements will not provide the basis for a presumption of dam-
ages so long as the court, not the jury, believes that the words are reason-
ably susceptible of an innocent interpretation. The opinion is so over-
burdened with technicalities, some inconsistent, and so empty of socialy
justified explanations as to be embarrassing. Be that as it may, the opin-
ion is one which dearly restricts the tort of libel to a smaller corner than
has ever been reserved for its sister tort of slander and which gives: a
large area of decision-making over to the trial judge. If nothing ele,
the opinion is evidence aplenty of the need for a wider knowledge in the
legal profession of the uses and abuses of language symbols.7
The Supreme Court has taken a large step in defining the "tort" duties
which may arise out of contractual transactions. In Durham v. The
Warner Elevator Mfg. Co.,8 plaintiff was injured at his place of employ-
ment when the elevator which he was using fell a considerable distance
in its shaft. The defendant company had contracted with plaintiff's em-
ployer to inspect and maintain the elevator. Accordingly, the court ruled
'Hunsche v. Alter, 145 N.E. 2d 368 (Ohio C.P. 1957). The first judicial limiia-
tion of Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
'Hartough v. Brint, 101 Ohio App. 350, 140 N.E.2d 34 (1955).
" Gibson v. Johnston, 144 N.B.2d 310 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
'Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Company, 139 N.E.2d 871 (Ohio Ct. App.
1957). There were, however, representations of quality by the manufacturer.
'Schindler v. The Standard Oil Co., 166 Ohio St. 391, 143 N.E.2d 133 (1957).
1165 Ohio St. 549, 138 N.E.2d 391 (1956). This opinion as well as the complete
history of libel per se in Ohio is ably discussed at Note, 9 WEST. RES. L. REv. 43
(1957).
"The court manifests its share of the widespread naivete regarding the psychology
of words, both from the point of view of the user and from the point of view of the
listener or reader. For a study of this general problem, see Symposium - The Lan-
guage of Law, 9 Wls. REs. L. REv. 117 (1958).
'166 Ohio St 31, 139 N.B.2d 10 (1956).
19581
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
that plaintiff could and had made out a jury case under the principles
of negligence law. The decision is in line with the trend across the coun-
try, applying the salutary principles of McPherson v. Buick Co.9 to inde-
pendent contractors as well as manufacturers.
In Lacey v. Laird,'0 the plaintiff was an eighteen year old girl who
had asked defendant doctor to perform plastic surgery on her nose. De-
fendant complied but made no attempt to obtain the consent of the par-
ents. In resolution of the plaintiff's suit for assault and battery, brought
to salve at least supposed wounds of humiliation, the Supreme Court in
a 4-3 disagreement held that this was not even a technical battery. The
three minority judges stuck to the older technical view that twenty-one is
the magic age of consent. Casting aside analogies of contract law, the
majority relied on the policy reflected in the criminal law which allowed
even younger girls to consent to other kinds of acts.
The remaining cases were all in some way related to the Ohio guest
statute." A sobering result was reached in Zalewski v. Yancey'2 in
which it was held that the intoxication of the driver is no bar to his lia-
bility under the guest statute. In another case, an injured rider made an
ingenious attempt to take himself out of the "guest" classification. De-
fendant driver had only a beginner's driving permit and asked plaintiff,
who had the unqualified license, to come along so that defendant might
drive legally and so get himself a "cup of coffee." The court rejected
the argument, being unable to find any express contract or business rela-
tionship.'3
In Lewis v. Woodland,14 the female -plaintiff was entering a car
owned by one of the drivers. Supposedly as a practical joke, a life-like
rubber lizard was exhibited to her in such a fashion as to cause her to
"jump up and down" and "break her back and injure herself." This situ-
ation was held to be outside the scope of the guest statute because at
the time of the incident the car was not in operation. Of further in
terest in the case is the disagreement of the deciding judges on a vital
point. The majority held that since physical injury had not been intended
the jury should determine whether the consequences were foreseeable.
The concurring judge expressed his opinion that there was sufficient
foreseeability to make the act culpable so that liability should follow for
all consequences directly related to the "culpable" act. There is no
9217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
ID 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956).
OHIo REv. CODE § 4515.02. For an excellent discussion of this statute and its in-
terpretations, see Note, 8 WEsT. RES. L. REv. 170 (1957).
12101 Ohio App. 501, 140 N.E.2d 592 (1956).
'Sabo v. Marn, 144 N.E.2d 248 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
Uune
